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Abstract 
The effects of a policy measure often reach the consumer only after one or more 
intermediate steps, for instance because the measure lowers the cost of an input for an 
industry producing a consumer good. This paper is concerned with the question how 
to measure such indirect effects correctly under conditions of perfect and imperfect 
competition. Conventional CBA measures the indirect effects on consumers as the 
direct effect on other actors (e.g. the Marshallian consumer’s surplus of the demand 
for the input whose price changes). Formal analysis establishes the correctness of this 
approach under perfect competition, provided that the demand curve is appropriately 
defined. Under less than perfect competition, the indirect effect can differ from the 
direct effect. Under monopoly the indirect effect is always larger than the direct 
effect. Under monopolistic competition it can be smaller, identical or larger, 
depending on the details of the model specification and on the possibility of entry. 
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1 Introduction 
Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) tries to measure the effects of carrying out a policy 
measure (such as a tax reform or an investment in infrastructure) on welfare. Since 
consumers are the only actors that can experience welfare, this implies that CBA 
should determine the effects of the policy measure on consumers in their various roles 
of buyers of consumption goods, suppliers of production factors, receivers of external 
effects et cetera. If the policy measure concerns only consumers (for instance, a 
change in a tax on a consumption good) there is no need to consider the effects of the 
measure on other actors. However, in many cases a policy measure concerns both 
consumers and other actors. The effects of the policy measure on the other actors 
result ultimately also in effects on consumers. For instance, if the government 
improves traffic infrastructure, transport costs for firms decrease and this may result 
in higher profits and a lower price for the output of these firms. The consumers of 
these outputs and the owners of the capital invested in these firms experience a 
welfare effect of this investment in an indirect way. In order to carry out a complete 
CBA, one should therefore in principle investigate the ways in which the effects of the 
projects on non-consumers will ultimately be translated into effects on consumers. 
If this would indeed have to be done, CBA would require a detailed understanding of 
all kinds of interrelations between the various actors in the economy. However, what 
is done usually, is to treat the direct effect on non-consumers as if they were effects on 
consumers. For instance, in the example of an improvement in traffic infrastructure 
one usually tries to estimate the effect of this measure on the demand for trips for 
various purposes and approximates the benefits by means of the change in the area 
under the relevant demand curves. This means that trips for business purposes are 
treated as if the actors concerned were persons, not firms. In other words: the indirect 
effects on persons are measured by direct effects on firms. 
This practice is sometimes defended by arguing that CBA is a generalization of the 
way in which entrepreneurs take their investment decisions. Since entrepreneurs look 
only at the direct effects of their actions and ignore effects elsewhere in the economy, 
CBA should proceed in the same way, if only to avoid differences in evaluation only 
because a project is financed publicly and not privately. This evokes the more 
fundamental question whether it is desirable for society to let entrepreneurs take their 
investment decisions in this way. The standard answer is a reference to the first 
theorem of welfare economics according to which the equilibrium of a competitive 
economy is also a Pareto optimum. This means that profit-maximizing behavior of 
firms brings the economy to its efficiency frontier, if the assumptions of the Arrow-
Debreu model are fulfilled. The argument suggests therefore that if CBA would 
mimic firm behavior, it could fulfill the same function for decisions that have to be 
taken by the government. 
An important reason why private decisions of profit maximizing entrepreneurs lead to 
Pareto optimality in an Arrow-Debreu economy is that every industry operates under 
conditions of constant returns to scale and with prices equal to marginal cost. Every 
change in the economy that leads to lower unit costs of production automatically leads 
to lower prices and this means that such cost advantages are completely passed 
through to the customers of the firm’s product and ultimately to the consumers. In this 
process the size of these advantages does not change: neither do they increase nor 
decrease. This is the reason why it is sufficient for the firms to take care of the effects 
of an investment on their own profits. 
In the present paper we investigate two questions that are left open by this argument. 
The first concerns the appropriate definition of the demand curve that should be used 
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to measure the direct effect on firms. The conventional demand curves for inputs take 
output volume as given. However, if the direct effect is used as an approximation of 
an indirect effect experienced by the consumers of the output, then this is clearly not 
appropriate. One may expect that the change in the input prices leads to a change in 
the output price because of profit maximization and/or competition. A change in the 
output price would lead to a change in output volume, invalidating the assumption 
that output remains constant. 
The second question refers to situations that deviate from perfect competition because 
prices differ from marginal costs and/or there are (dis)economies of scale. Since such 
situations are absent in the Arrow-Debreu economy assumed by the argument for 
equality of direct and indirect effects, this question is still open. It is the purpose of 
this paper to look also at such situations in a relatively simple setting and see whether 
the usual argument still holds. 
In recent years, it has been argued from different points of view that investments in 
public infrastructure might be more beneficial to society than is usually thought. First, 
Aschauer (1989) argued that the social benefits of such public expenditure were very 
high. Although his results have been criticized by a number of other researchers (see 
Gramlich (1994) for a review of the debate), one important feature that has been 
highlighted is the stimulating effect that public infrastructure has on private 
investment (see Munnel, 1992). The existence of such an effect does not necessarily 
imply that conventional CBA is wrong, but it seems worthwhile to investigate the 
issue somewhat closer by means of a formal model that allows one to study the 
‘forward linkages’ involved in such investments, as the present paper does. Second, 
the ‘new economic geography’ that recently emerged as a subfield of economics 
incorporates agglomeration effects that were traditionally difficult to deal with in 
economic models. It does so by assuming that there is imperfect competition in some 
industries. Venables and Gasiorek (1998) provide simulation results that suggest that 
in such an economy the results of transport improvements might be substantially 
larger than is suggested by conventional CBA. On the other hand, Newbery (1998) 
provides some examples that show that in some situations conventional CBA might 
overestimate the welfare gains from public investment. In the sections that follow we 
try to uncover the reasons why conventional CBA might be biased in a context that 
allows us to derive analytical results. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 some preliminary steps are taken for 
the modeling exercises that follow. Section 3 considers the situation of perfect 
competition and verifies the equality between direct and indirect effects under these 
circumstances. Section 4 looks at a monopoly situation and analyses the possible 
difference between direct and indirect effects in such a situation. The main result is 
that the correctly measured welfare effects are in this situation always larger than the 
direct effect. In section 5  we study the intermediate situation in which there is 
imperfect competition. The  Dixit-Stiglitz and logit models are considered with a 
given number of firms as well as with free entry. We obtain remarkably different 
results for the various cases we consider. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Preliminaries 
In this section we will introduce some terminology, give a simple example of the 
analysis to be carried out in more generality in later sections and provide an outline 
the model of the firm that will be used. 
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Some terminology 
We consider the situation in which the price of a particular commodity changes 
because of some policy measure. If the price change concerns a consumption good, all 
its welfare effects are direct, in the sense that the consequences for the utility of 
consumers are caused by the price change itself. If the commodity is not, or not 
exclusively, a consumption good some of its welfare effects are indirect, in the sense 
that they realize themselves via a causal chain of reactions from the original price 
change to changes in other prices. For instance, if transport infrastructure is improved, 
drivers of private cars benefit as well as firms that have to pay lower transportation 
costs for their inputs and outputs. 
In order to focus in the indirect effect of a price change, we assume throughout the 
paper that the commodity whose price changes because of the policy measure is used 
as input in an industry whose output is a consumption good. Moreover, we assume for 
simplicity that the commodity is only used as an intermediary good in this industry 
and cannot be consumed directly. 
The direct effect of the policy measure is determined as the change in the area under 
the industry’s demand curve for the input. The indirect effect of the policy measure is 
the effect that this price change has on (a) the profits of the firm and (b) the welfare of 
its customers. The latter effect occurs as a consequence of a change in the price of the 
firms output in reaction to the input price. We usually assume that the effect on 
consumers can be described accurately by the Marshallian consumer surplus. Note 
that one of the two components of the indirect effect can be zero. The indirect effects 
might induce further changes in the economy, but these are not taken into account in 
the present paper. 
The question in which we are interested here is: are the indirect effects of the policy 
measure accurately measured by the direct effects? The difference between the direct 
and the indirect effects will be referred to as the additional indirect effect (AIE). It is 
clear that such an additional indirect effect, which may be of either sign, should be 
taken into account in CBA. 
In order to introduce the analysis we will be carrying out, we consider a simple 
example. 
 
A simple example 
As mentioned above, we assume that a policy measure results in a change in the price 
of a commodity that is used as an input in a particular industry. A CBA is carried out 
which takes into account the direct effects only. We denote the demand for the input 
whose price changes as x and indicate the situation in which the measure is taken by 
means of a superscript 1 and the situation in which it is not taken by means of a 
superscript 0. For both situations the demand is estimated. These estimates provide 
two points of the demand curve for the product. The price of the commodity is 
denoted as p. If the direct effect of the price change is measured by the familiar ‘rule 
of one half’ we find for the direct effect DS: 
 
 )()(5. 1010 ppxxS -+=D       1 
 
The change in consumer’s surplus that is the result of the change in the input price is 
measured on the basis of the demand for the industry’s output in the two situations. 
We denote this demand by y. Demand will only change if the price of this ouptut, 
which we denote as r, changes. If this happens, the change in consumer surplus DCS 
can also be computed on the basis of the ‘rule of half’: 
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Will the changes in both surpluses be equal to each other? In order to answer this 
question we make some additional simplifying assumptions (which will be relaxed 
later on). First, we assume that the price of the output is equal to its marginal cost. 
Second, we assume that production technology has fixed technical coefficients. We 
denote the quantity of the input needed to produce one unit of output as a and we 
should have: x0=ay0 and x1=ay1. The change in unit cost (which is equal to marginal 
cost and output price) is equal to a(p0-p1). We can use these relationships to elaborate 
on the change in consumer’s surplus: 
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The second line of this expression uses the expression for the change in the output 
price, the third makes use of the fixed technical coefficients, the fourth line gives a 
simplification of the third. Since the fourth line give the expression for the surplus DS, 
it establishes the equality of the direct and indirect effect for this case. It should be 
noted that in order to do so, we had to take into account the change in output volume 
that occurred as a consequence of the change in the output price because of the change 
in the input price. If the surplus DS had been measured on the basis of a demand curve 
that assumed the output volume to be constant, it would have been equal to x0(p0-p1), 
which underestimates the actual effect. 
Below we will generalize this analysis to situations in which the ‘rule of one 
half’(which is exact only for linear demand curves) is not used, in which there can be 
substitution between inputs and also to situations in which there are no constant 
returns to scale and prices may differ from marginal cost. For these situations we use 
a more general model of the firm that is outlined below. 
  
The model of the firm 
We consider a firm that produces a scalar output y. from a vector of inputs x; by 
means of a production function F: 
 
 )(xFy =         4 
 
Profits Z are the difference between revenues and costs: 
 
 .pxryZ -=         5 
 
where r is the unit price of the output and p input price. We assume from now on that 
the price of a single input, the i-th, changes because of the policy measure, whereas 
the price of all other inputs remain constant. 
Profit maximization implies that the firm wants to minimize its costs K: 
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 pxK =         6 
 
for a given output volume y* : 
 
 *)( yxF =         7 
 
Demand functions for inputs, which are conditioned upon the output level, can be 
derived from this minimization problem. Substitution of these demand functions into 
the definition of costs in equation 6 leads to the cost function K(p,y), which gives total 
costs as a function of the input prices and output volume. Conventional demand 
functions can be derived from the cost function by means of Shephard’s lemma: 
 
 
i
i p
ypK
ypx
¶
¶
=
),(
),(        8 
 
These demand functions describe movements along a single isoquant (determined by 
output volume y). This implies that they reflect the substitution between inputs that 
will take place as a result of the change in the price of input i.  
It has been argued above that output volume cannot be taken to be constant for the 
analysis to be carried out in the present paper. The effect of the change in the price of 
input i on output price r is important: If the output price remains constant, there will 
be no be no change in consumer’s surplus, but only an effect on the firm’s profits. If 
the output price changes, there will also be a change in output volume and therefore 
also in the demand for input i. This change in demand is causally related to the change 
in the price of input i and is therefore part of its direct effect. 
In order to derive the appropriate demand function for the present purposes, we 
should take into account that the firm’s output yF is a function of the input prices p 
because the price of the output is a function of the input prices. We write: 
 
 )( pyy FF =         9 
 
Equation 9 implies that, given the prices of all other inputs, there is one particular 
output level for any value of the price pi. The demand function that takes this into 
account can be written as: 
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If the demand function given in eq. 7 is summed over the number of firms in the 
industry, we arrive at the demand function that is used in conventional CBA. 
In the sections that follow, we will apply this model of the firm and its demand for 
outputs in various market structures. 
 
3 Perfect competition 
In this section we will consider the measurement of direct and indirect effects in the 
context of perfect competition and investigate the equality of both. Although it is 
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common sense among economists that under perfect competition there will be no 
indirect effects, a formal analysis of this question seems to be lacking. 
Under perfect competition output price r is equal to the average cost k. The average 
costs function k(y,p) can be derived from this total cost function K by taking its ratio 
with the output volume: 
 
 
y
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and we have for the output price: 
 
 ),( ypkr =         12 
 
All firms produce the output volume yPC at which unit costs are minimal: 
 
 { }),(minarg)( ypkpy
y
PC =       13 
The volume at which unit costs are minimal may be dependent on the input prices. If 
we substitute the optimal output level into eq. 12 we arrive at a more specific relation 
between output price and input prices: 
 
 ))(,( pypkr PC=        14 
 
Total demand for the product of the industry is described by means of an aggregate 
demand function: 
 
 )(ryy =         15 
 
Total demand y should be equal to total output and the number of firms n can 
therefore be computed as: 
 
 PCyypn /)( =        16 
 
This equation does not guarantee that n is integer valued, but we ignore any 
complications that might be result from this approximation. 
The cost function for the industry as a whole can be written as: 
 
 ))(,(),(* pypkyypK PC=       17 
 
which shows that it operates under constant returns to scale (CRS). The market 
functions in such a way that the total costs K* are minimized for a given output level 
we may derive the total demand for input i by using Shephard’s lemma. Moreover 
taking into account the possible effects of a change in pi on yPC we write the demand 
function for input i that is used in CBA as: 
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It should be noted that this demand function takes into account three possible effects 
of a change in the price of input i on its demand: 
- a substitution effect 
- an effect on the optimal output volume of a single firm yPC 
- an effect on the demand for the industry’s output y. 
The direct effect of the change in pi is a change in the area under the demand function 
given in eq. 18 and above the prevailing price. This area will be denoted as the surplus 
S and we have: 
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Consumer’s surplus CS is defined as: 
 
 ò
¥
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There are no profits and therefore no producer’s surplus. Social surplus is therefore 
equal to consumer’s surplus. 
The change in consumer’s surplus that occurs because of the policy measure is: 
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whereas the change in the surplus S is equal to: 
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In order to establish the equality of both, we take three steps. 
1) Since the price of the output is equal to its average cost, we can change the variable 
over which integration takes place from r to k and rewrite eq. 21 as: 
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where k0 denotes unit cost in the situation without the project and and k1 in the 
situation in which the project is carried out.  
2) The only reason for the change in the unit cost is the change in the price of input i. 
We change the variable over which the integration take place again, viz. from k to pi: 
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Note that we have taken into account that the optimal output volume of an individual 
firm and the output volume of the industry might change as a consequence of the 
change in pi. 
3) Next, we observe that average cost equals output price and compare eq. 24 with eq. 
18. 
In conclusion, we find that under perfect competition it is justified to measure indirect 
effects on consumers by means of direct effects on firms, since the latter are carried 
through to the consumers without any change. It should be noted that for this equality 
to hold, the appropriate demand function for input i should be used which 
incorporates not only the effects of substitution, but also the effect of a change in 
demand for the industry’s output. The latter occurs as a result of a change in the 
industry’s output price evoked by the change in pi. 
 
4 Monopoly 
In this section we consider a monopoly situation and analyze the existence of AIE 
under these circumstances. If an AIE exist, it seems natural to look for it in a 
monopoly, since it is the opposite to perfect competition. 
We use the same model for the individual firm as in the previous section, but now we 
assume that there is only one firm in the industry. This firm takes the demand function 
for its product as given and is able to determine its own price. It does so in order to 
maximize its profits, which are defined as: 
 
 pxryZ -=         25 
 
The maximization problem can be considered as consisting of two parts: minimization 
of the costs by a given output volume and determination of the optimal output 
volume. Cost minimization has already been considered above. Substitution of the 
firm’s cost function into the definition of profits leads to the firm’s profit function, 
which has the price r as the firm’s only remaining decision variable: 
 
 ),()( ypKrryZ -=        26 
 
The first order condition for profit maximization is: 
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which can be rewritten as:: 
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where mc denotes marginal cost (mc=¶K/¶y) and e is the absolute value of the price 
elasticity of demand. Equation 28 give the familiar condition for profit maximization 
according to which the mark-up (expressed as a fraction of the price) should be equal 
to minus the inverse of the price elasticity of demand. 
The sum of the changes in consumer’s surplus and profits is the change in social 
surplus DSS: 
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The change in consumer’s surplus is defined in eq. 21, whereas the change in profits 
equals: 
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where the second line makes use of eq. 26 and takes into account that the output price 
r depends on pi, and also that output volume y is influenced by pi. The change in 
output volume influences revenues as well as costs. 
The first expression on the right-hand-side in the second line of eq. 30 is equal to 
minus the change in consumer’s surplus. The change in social surplus is therefore 
equal to the sum of the second and third term:  
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The first term on the right-hand-side of eq. 31 (including the minus-sign) is positive 
when the price exceeds marginal cost, since the demand curve is negatively sloped 
and the output price is an increasing function of the input price.1 The second term is 
equal to DS:  
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The second line states that the change in S is equal to the integral in the partial 
derivative of the cost function with respect to pi. It should be taken into account, when 
performing the integration, that the output volume at which the partial derivative is 
evaluated is itself a function of pi. 
We conclude therefore that the first term on the right hand side of eq. 31 is an AIE, 
i.e. an indirect effect that is not properly taken into account by the measurement of the 
direct effect. 
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1 This follows from the first order condition for profit maximization if marginal cost is increasing in the 
price of input i. 
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Since the AIE is positive, it follows that conventional CBA underestimates the true 
welfare effect of the change in price pi. In other words, the common sense that it is 
sufficient to take into account direct effects is not valid if the industry is a monopoly. 
Below it will be shown that the size of the AIE can be determined with greater 
precision if we are willing to make additional assumptions. 
 
Some special cases 
We now consider some special cases: 
- Linear demand function, CRS. We write down the demand function as: 
 
  arAy -=         34 
 
Marginal cost is equal to average cost k, and a function of the prices of all inputs. 
The direct effect can be written as: 
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where the second line makes use of the CRS, and the third of the facts that the 
demand function is linear and that the profit maximizing output price equals: 
r=(A/a+k(p))/2. 
The AIE can now be written as: 
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where use is made of the expression for the profit maximizing price. 
Comparison of the direct effect with the additional indirect effect shows the latter 
to be equal to one half of the former: In this case the additional indirect effect is 
50% of the direct effect. 
- Linear demand function, linear cost function. We write the cost function as: 
 
)()(),( pvypFypK +=       37 
 
where the fixed cost F is non-decreasing in input prices. We find for the direct 
effect (using eq. 35 and the linearity of the demand function): 
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For the AIE, the expression given in eq. 36 remains valid, with k(p) replaced by 
v(p). We may therefore conclude that in this case the additional indirect effect is 
positive and at most equal to 50% of the direct effect. 
- Loglinear demand function, linear cost function. We write the demand function as: 
 
  e-= Ary ,        39 
 
 the cost function is given in eq. 33. The direct effect is: 
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 and the additional indirect effect equals: 
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where use has been made of the fact that the profit maximizing price equals   
(e/(e-1))v(p). In the special case in which fixed costs are independent of the price 
of input i the additional indirect effect equals e /(e-1) times the direct effect. The 
additional indirect effect is then always larger than (more than 100% of) the direct 
effect, and especially so if the elasticity of demand is just above 1.2 
 
Effects on consumer’s surplus 
It is useful to pay special attention to the change in consumer’s surplus that occurs as 
a consequence of the policy measure. Most politicians would be more interested in the 
effects of their policy on consumers than on the owners of the capital invested in 
firms. Moreover, it can be argued that a social welfare function would also give a 
larger weight to the utility of consumers than to that of capital owners, for instance 
because consumers have on average lower incomes than capital owners. 
If there is a change in the price r it is a reaction to the change in pi. The profit 
maximizing price is a function of all input prices. Since the price of the i-th input is 
the only one that changes, we can write r as a function of pi: 
 
 )( ipfr =         42 
 
and use this to rewrite eq. 21 as: 
                                                          
2 In absolute value; note that monopoly pricing requires demand to be elastic. 
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In general there is no reason why y(pi)f’(pi) should, in the present circumstances, be 
equal to xiKBA as is required for equality with the direct effect We can derive an 
expression for  f’(pi ) from the first order condition (eq. 27). Since this condition 
should be valid before and after the price change, the change in r, dr, should 
compensate exactly for the effects of the change in pi, dpi. This enables us to 
determine the differential ratio dr/dpi which equals f’(pi): 
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Under perfect competition the numerator of the expression on the right hand side of 
the analogous equation was equal to ¶k/¶pi, the derivative of average cost to the price. 
In the absence of constant return to scale, there is in general no necessary relation 
between the derivatives of the average and marginal cost. 
The denominator looks complicated. The slope of the demand curve is negative. The 
partial derivative of the marginal cost to output volume can be positive (decreasing 
returns to scale) as well as negative (increasing returns to scale). If we assume the 
demand function to be convex (as is often done), then ¶2y/¶r is positive. This implies 
that scale effects determine the sign of the second term in the denominator. The sign 
of the third term is negative, leaving the sign of the denominator as a whole 
undetermined.  
If we are willing to make additional simplifying assumptions, the analysis gives more 
definite results: 
- linear demand function, CRS. In this case the marginal costs are equal to the 
average costs and are the second and third terms in the denominator equal to 0. 
This allows us to simplify eq. 44 to: 
 
 .
2
)(' ii
p
k
pf
¶
¶
=        45 
 
Substitution of this results in eq. 43 and comparison of the result with eq. 35 leads 
to the conclusion that the change in consumer’s surplus is half as large as the 
change in the surplus under the demand function for input i.3  The direct effect 
gives therefore an overestimate of the effect of the price change on consumer’s 
surplus, whereas we saw earlier that it gives an underestimate of the total effect. 
- linear demand function, linear cost function. The marginal costs are in this case 
equal to the variable cost v(p), which is independent of production volume. Eq. 44 
can now be written as: 
                                                          
3 Output written as a function of the price is y(p)=[A-ak(p)]/2. 
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Substitution in eq. 43, and comparison with eq. 38 leads to the conclusion that the 
change in consumer’s surplus will in this case be at most one half of the change in 
surplus DS. 
- Loglinear demand function, linear cost function. Since marginal cost is 
independent of pi and the price elasticity is constant, we can write f’(pi) as: 
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Where the linearity of the cost function has been used. Again, we substitute this 
result in eq. 43. We compare the result with eq. 40. If the fixed cost is independent 
of the price of input i (¶F/¶pi=0), then f’(pi) the change in consumer’s surplus is 
larger than the change in the surplus measured under the demand curve for input i. 
If the fixed cost depends on input price pi it may be smaller. 
 
Discussion 
The analysis of this section has shown that under monopoly the indirect effects of a 
policy measure that lowers the price of an input are always larger than the direct 
effects. Such an industry generates a positive AIE that may be large in comparison to 
the direct effect. Two remarks are in order. 
First, it is well known that it welfare increases when a monopolist is subsidized. This 
‘paradoxical result’ (Tirole, 1988, p. 68) is related to the analysis of this section. If a 
policy measure results in a lower input price for the monopolist, it has a similar effect 
as a subsidy. 
Second, from our discussion of special cases it appears that the size of the AIE 
depends on the details of the specific model at hand. In particular, the use of a linear 
or a loglinear demand curve makes a lot of difference. In combination with CRS, the 
former leads to an AIE that is 50% of the direct effect, the later to an AIE that is at 
least 100% of the direct effect. In order to measure the size of the AIE correctly, it 
seems to be of crucial importance to know not only how the level of demand changes 
with the price (i.e. the slope of the demand curve), but also how the price elasticity 
changes with the price  (i.e. the second order derivative of the demand curve). In 
practice it may not be easy to get the relevant information. 
   
5 Monopolistic competition 
In this section we will investigate the existence of AIE’s on markets with monopolistic 
competition. In recent years models that describe markets with differentiated products 
by means of Nash equilibria have been used intensively in theoretical and empirical 
research. An important reason for this is the opinion that actual markets are neither 
perfectly competitive, nor perfectly monopolistic. It seems therefore of importance to 
investigate the possible existence and size of AIE’s on such markets. The present 
section does so for two popular models: the Dixit Stiglitz model and the logit model. 
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Results of the previous section, and the fact that in monopolisitc competition all firms 
have some market power lead to the conjecture that AIE’s will be detected. 
 
The Dixit-Stiglitz model with a given number of firms 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model the demand for a differentiated product by means of a 
representative consumer. We specify the utility of this consumer as:4 
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where a and r should be positive, moreover r should be smaller than 1. 
In this equation y1…yn denote the quantities consumed of the n varieties of the 
differentiated product, and y0 that of another, composite consumption good. Utility is 
maximized under a budget restriction: 
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The demand functions that result from this problem are: 
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All firms have an identical linear cost function as given by eq. 37 above: 
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and maximize their profits: 
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by setting their price and producing the corresponding market demand. Dixit and 
Stiglitz assume that firms take the denominator of the first term of demand function in 
eq. 50 as given. The price set by such firms can be derived as: 
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Since the cost and demand functions and the behavior of all firms are identical, they 
will all set the same price r and produce the same output volume y. This output 
volume can be determined as y=X/(1+a)nr. Using these results, we find that profits 
are equal to: 
 
                                                          
4 Dixit and Stiglitz consider two generalizations of this utility function. 
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and therefore independent of the marginal cost v(p). 
Since the utility function of eq. 48 is homothetic, the sum of the consumer’s surpluses 
provides a correct welfare measure as long as income does not change (Chipman and 
Moore, 1980).5 The change in consumer’s surplus that is the result of the change in 
the price of input i is: 
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Our welfare measure is the change in social surplus SS which is again defined  as the 
sum of the changes in consumer’s surplus and profits. Using equations 55 and 54, we 
can write: 
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This gives the correct expression for the benefits associated with a change in the price 
of input i in the present circumstances.  
The direct effects of the change in the input price can be measured in the same way as 
was done in the previous sections, viz. as the change in the area under the demand 
curve for input i: 
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5 However, it should be noted that in te change in consumer’s surplus is not equal to the compensating 
variation CV). The two are related as follows: CV/X=1-exp(-DCS/X) (see Chipman and Moore, 1980, 
p.945), This implies that different results with respect to the AIE will be reached if the CV is used. 
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The difference between the social surplus and the direct effect is therefore equal to: 
 
  
ò ¶
¶
+
-=
D-D=
0
1 )(
1
1
)1(
i
i
p
p
i
i
dp
p
v
pv
X
SSSAIE
a
r
     58 
 
This shows that there will always be a positive AIE. If the fixed cost is independent of 
the price of input i the AIE will be a fraction (1-r)/r of the direct effect, which may 
vary from 0 to infinity and will be larger than 1 if r<.5. 
In order to interpret this result, we note that r is inversely related to the ‘preference 
for diversity’ of the representative consumer. A strong preference for diversity leads 
to a relatively large monopoly power for the individual firms (cf. eq. 53) and this 
makes the industry with monopolistic competition more or less equal to the monopoly 
studied in the previous section. 
 
Dixit-Stiglitz model with free entry 
Now we assume that the number of firms, which we treat as a real number, adjusts so 
as to keep profits equal to zero. It is not hard to derive from eq. 54 that the number of 
firms will in this case be equal to: 
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From this equation it is clear that the number of firms will only change if fixed cost F 
depends on the price of output i. If the number of firms changes, we should take the 
total consumer’s surplus generated by the additional firms as part of the welfare 
change. This surplus must be evaluated at the prices in the situation with the policy 
measure (i.e. situation 1). Assume that one product, the k-th is added to the existing n 
ones. The consumer surplus CS* generated by the new product is: 
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where all prices in the third line should be evaluated in situation 1. 
Taking into account that all firms charge the same price for their product leads to the 
following simplification: 
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We generalize this formula to the case in which the number of firms changes from n0 
to n1 as: 
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and make use of eq. 59 in order to rewrite this as: 
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This should be added to the consumer surplus as derived in eq. 55. The total change in 
consumer surplus thus becomes: 
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For the change in the area under the demand curve for input i we find: 
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The AIE is therefore equal to: 
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Comparison with eq. 58 shows that an additional term is added, which represents the 
effect of entry. This term is different from zero only if the fixed cost depends on the 
price of input i. This implies that there will be no (nonzero) additional term under 
CRS. 
We conclude that the direct effect underestimates the indirect welfare effects of the 
policy measure. Only a fraction r of he effect that occurs via the change in the 
variable cost is measured and only a fraction (1-r) of the effect that occurs via the 
change in the fixed cost. Note that the former effect is measured correctly by the 
direct effect if the preference for diversity is small (r close to 1) 
 
The logit model with a given number of firms 
We will now consider the logit model as an alternative model for product 
differentiation. McFadden (1981) developed a representative consumer theory for the 
logit model and Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992, and earlier papers referred to 
in this book) used the model in order to study an industry with differentiated products. 
The indirect utility function of the representative consumer is: 
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The representative consumer buys one unit of the product per period and the size of 
the market is equal to N. The probability that variety k will be chosen is: 
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The expected demand for the product j is therefore equal to Npj. We treat the pj’s as 
(deterministic) market shares. 
We assume that all firms have identical linear cost functions, as in the Dixit-Stiglitz 
model.  Profits of firm j are equal to: 
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where we have used the now familiar assumption that all firms have identical linear 
cost functions. The first-order condition for profit maximization leads to the following 
expression for the optimal price: 
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Since all firms have identical demand and cost functions, they all set the same prices 
and their market shares will be equal to 1/n. 
Substitution of the profit-maximizing price in the profit function leads to the 
following expression: 
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Note that, as in the Dixit-Stiglitz model, profits are independent of the variable cost v. 
The change in profits that results form a change in input price i is: 
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Substitution of the profit maximizing prices in the utility function leads to the 
following expression for the utility of the representative consumer: 
 
 ( ) ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
+
-
-+=
mm
)(
1
ln
pv
n
n
n
X
V      72 
 
This expression can be used to derive the compensating variation of a change in the 
price of input i as: 
 
 .
0
1
ò ¶
¶
=
i
i
p
p
i
i
dp
p
v
CV        73 
 
Chipman and More (1976, 1980) have shown that for the indirect utility function of 
eq. 66 compensating variation is exactly equal to the sum of the consumer surpluses.6 
The change in social surplus is equal to N times the compensating variation plus n 
times the change in profits: 
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The change in the area under the demand curve for input i equals: 
 
                                                          
6 As long as we measure all prices relative to those of a numeraire outside consumption good whose 
price is kept constant. 
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We conclude therefore that in this case the indirect effect is correctly measured by the 
direct effect. 
 
The logit model with free entry 
With free entry, profits are equal to zero, and this allows us to determine the number 
of firms from eq. 70 as: 
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Note that, just as in the Dixit-Stiglitz model, the variable (marginal) cost does not 
appear in this expression. 
It follows from eq. 69 that prices will be equal to: 
 
 
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
++=
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
++=
1
)(
)(
)(
1
)(
)(
m
m
mm
m
N
pF
pv
pF
N
pF
N
pvr
     74 
 
and from eq. 72 that the utility of the representative consumer is: 
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Since profits are equal to zero, the change in social surplus equals N times the 
compensating variation of the representative consumer: 
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The change in the area under the demand curve for input i can be computed as 
follows: 
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Comparison of eqs. 77 and 76 allows us to determine the AIE as: 
 
 
  
ò ¶
¶
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
+
-=
D-D=
0
1 )(
)(i
i
p
p
i
i
dp
p
F
pFN
pF
SSSAIE
m
     78 
 
 
The most surprising aspect of eq. 78 is its sign: the additional indirect effect turns out 
to be negative in this case. The direct effect overestimates the benefits of the project. 
The bias in the direct effect is small if the preference for diversity (measured by m), 
and/or the size of the market is large, and if the fixed cost is small, which implies that 
the industry operates close to CRS. The bias is of course absent if fixed costs are 
independent of the price of input i. 
 
Discussion 
In this section we analyzed the additional indirect effects that result when a decrease 
in the price of an input reaches the consumers and capital owners via an industry that 
is imperfectly competitive. We used two models that are widely used in theoretical 
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analyses of markets with differentiated products, the Dixit-Stiglitz model and the logit 
model. 
Perhaps the most striking result from the analysis is that the results with respect to 
existence and size of AIE’s are so different for these two types of models. There are 
many similarities between the two models (see Anderson, de Palma and Thisse, 1992, 
for a discussion) and one would therefore expect that both would lead to similar 
conclusions with respect to AIE’s. However, this is not the case. In our analysis of a 
monopoly situation we found that the details of the demand specification were 
important for the conclusions. This is confirmed by the results of the present section, 
which uses models in which the cost functions are identical and only the demand 
specifications differ. 
A second result is that our expectation that markets with monopolistic competition 
would lead to results that are somewhere in between those for monopoly and perfect 
competition was equally invalid. For the logit model with free entry, a negative AIE 
was found, implying that conventional CBA would overestimate the welfare effects of 
the policy measure. 
One may argue that the simple models used here are not appropriate for the task at 
hand in real world situations. The logit model tends to provide an overestimate the 
importance of new products because of the ‘red bus, blue bus’ phenomenon. For 
instance, Hausman (1997) has argued that the logit model, because of its IIA property, 
‘typically leads to a vast overestimate of the consumer’s surplus from a new good’ (p. 
230). He prefers the CES model, that is part of the Dixit-Stiglitz model. Also for that 
model he concludes that the effect of new goods is estimated as an unrealistically 
large value. However, for the purposes of the present paper, the important fact is that 
the Dixit-Stiglitz and logit models are two of the most popular ones for studying 
monopolisitc competition. We have no reason for assuming that the direct effect as 
measured by the increase in the area under the demand curve does a better job in 
estimating the ‘true’ effect of the introduction of new goods in other models of 
monopolistic competition. In the analytical setting used above the true (indirect) 
effects are given by determined by the CES- and logit-specifications and we found 
that they cannot be properly measured by the direct effect. The basic problem 
therefore seems to be that there is no systematic relationship between the size of the 
direct effect and that of the indirect effect in situations with monopolistic competition. 
If true, this inplies that there isno guarantee that the measurement of direct effects will 
give better results under less stylized conditions that make it harder to determine the 
true indirect effects based on the correct model. 
 
6 Conclusion 
Apart from the case of perfect competition there is no reason to assume that the direct 
effects are a correct or even a reasonably good proxy for the indirect effects. The 
conventional approach in CBA to measure indirect effects by means of direct effects 
can only be justified on the basis of the assumption that the economy is perfectly 
competitive. The analysis of the present paper suggests that even ‘minor’ 
discrepancies from perfect competition as occur under monopolistic competition are 
able to cause substantial AIE’s that may be positive as well as negative. In the 
situation of a monopoly, the direct effect always underestimates the indirect effect by 
a fraction that depends crucially in the details of the specification of the demand 
function. 
The analysis offered in the previous sections shows that AIE’s will in general exist, 
may be substantial and that their sign and size depends crucially on the details of the 
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situation. The conventional shortcut provided by the measurement of indirect effects 
as if they were direct effects can only be justified on the basis of an unrealistic 
assumption. 
The implication of this conclusion is, of course, that CBA becomes much more 
complicated and requires a study of the way the effects of policy measures pass 
through the economy to the consumers, even if one is willing to undertake a partial 
equilibrium analysis only. Often this would require knowledge of the functioning of 
markets with imperfect competition. In recent years the modeling of such markets, for 
instance those for automobiles and ready-to-eat cereals, has received a lot of interest 
(see Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995, Nevo, 2001) and substantial progress has 
been made. 
A possible argument against the incorporation AIE’s in CBA is that they are only the 
result of market imperfections, which should be cured preferably by other means than 
policy measures intended to reach other goals. Inclusion of positive AIE’s that are the 
result of such market imperfections could possibly diminish the incentive to treat 
these imperfections by other means. However, it must be noted that the AIE’s are as 
real as the imperfectly competitive industries that generate them and as long as the 
latter exist, it is hard to see why the former should be ignored. One might argue as 
well that the existence of imperfectly competitive industries shows that (additional) 
intervention to increase competitiveness would be unjustified from a policy making 
perspective. Their presence and its consequences, including the existence of possibly 
substantial AIE’s should therefore be taken as a fact of life that has to be dealt with 
appropriately instead of being ignored. 
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